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Abstract   
The purpose of this article is to identify, explain and critique the substantial changes in the UK revised Corporate 
governance Code as well as the Wates Principles. This article argues that these changes could promote the 
performance of the investors and companies in dealing with economic issues. On the other hand, these changes 
are less effective when it comes to social and environmental issues.  
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Introduction  
Substantial global attention has been paid to corporate governance since the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008. A 
strong corporate governance can make a country an attractive place for both investors and business. Britain has 
been a global pioneer in corporate governance for a long time. The Cadbury Committee published in 1992, the 
first edition of the UK Code for Corporate Governance (the Code). While major business failures in the UK have 
given rise to social and business worries, the UK has always pursued a proportionate mechanism for improving 
corporate governance. The Green Paper of the Government, released on 29 November 2016, initiating a broad-
based dialogue on how to improve the corporate management system in the United Kingdom. As a response 
from the Government to the green paper the Government invited the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) to 
revise the Corporate Governance Code. In 2018 The FRC Issued the revised Code and established the Wates 
Principles with a variety of partners and in 2020 issued the revised the Stewardship Code. However, The FRC 
believe these substantial changes will improve the role of investors and companies in resolving economic, 
environmental and social problems.  
 
The UK Corporate Governance Code (2018) 
In 2018, the FRC issued the revised UK Corporate Governance Code with some substantial changes and a 
different structure. The new Code has five sections: leadership and purpose, division of responsibilities, 
composition succession and evaluation, audit risk, and internal control and remuneration. Some principles and 
provisions of the previous Code were incorporated into the revised Code’s principles and provisions. However, 
the revised Code emphasises some concepts by altering some principles and provisions or by establishing new 
ones.  
One of the main changes to the revised Code is its focus on the importance of positive relationships 
between companies, shareholders and stakeholders through detailed changes, such as the emphasis on the quality 
of the board and on a company’s relationships with a wider range of stakeholders. 1  Despite the primary 
responsibility of managers to support their company's long-term success, the FRC is persuaded that businesses 
should consider the importance other stakeholders in this success. Thus, the new Code promotes corporate 
governance policies and practices that create shareholder value and seek to support society. Principle A states 
that ‘‘A successful company is led by an effective and entrepreneurial board whose role is to promote the long-
term sustainable success of the company, generating value for shareholders and contributing to wider society”.2 
The Code’s focus on a wide range of stakeholders is also apparent in Provision 5, which confirms that the board 
should consider the interests of other key stakeholders of the company and explain in the annual report that the 
board considered their views in their consultations and decision-making, in compliance with section 172 of the 
Companies Act 2006.3  
Although Principle A and Provision 5 of the revised Code affirm the significance of a positive relationship 
between the company and wider society, the Code does not provide much detail about who is included in the 
wide range of stakeholders with which the company must maintain a good relationship or how this should be 
done. Moreover, only part of Provision 5 covers company–stakeholder relationships, while the other part covers 
the company’s engagement with the workforce. However, Provision 5 refers to section 172 of the Companies 
Act 2006, which provides more detail about this issue, such as the need to cultivate good ties between a company 
and its suppliers and consumers and others. In addition to section 172 of the Companies Act 2006, the Guidance 
 
1 Financial Reporting Council (FRC), Revised UK Corporate Governance Code 2018 highlights (2018) 
2  Financial Reporting Council (FRC), The UK Corporate Governance Code (2018) 
3 Ibid 
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 




on Board Effectiveness 2018 adds further explanation of how this relationship should work.1 Thus, not providing 
adequate details about this relationship in the revised Code’s provisions makes it possible that companies may 
not comply with this issue in a way that is beneficial to its main purpose.  
The emphasis on the significance of positive relationships between companies, shareholders and 
stakeholders is also apparent in another detailed change to the Code, which is to encourage companies to foster 
effective engagement with their shareholders. Several provisions encourage engagement with shareholders. 
Provision 3 indicates that the chairman should establish frequent contact with key shareholders, in addition to 
regular general meetings, to clarify their opinions on governance and performance in response to the plan. The 
chairs of the Committee should try to include the shareholders in discussion of significant issues affecting their 
areas of responsibility. The Chairman should ensure the board interprets the views of shareholders consistently.2 
However, the statement that committee chairs should engage with shareholders about important issues relating to 
their areas of responsibility could prove problematic in certain cases. For instance, audit committees often find 
that constructive communication with clients can be difficult to achieve. The Committee chairs may have to 
strengthen their actions, but progress in that field would require the society’s dedication and additional 
resources.3 
A change to Provision 4 also provides more information regarding this relationship. Companies should 
communicate with shareholders in their general meetings where they obtain large votes against resolution. 
Provision 4 of the revised Code says that, if 20% or more of the board votes against a proposal, the company 
should clarify, when reporting the results, what steps it plans to take to inform shareholders and consider the 
reasons for the results.4 Moreover, the Guidance on Board Effectiveness 2018 argues that, when the board 
focuses mainly on large shareholders, minor investors may be ignored. The board can suggest additional ways to 
involve smaller shareholders, such as collective engagement strategies including roundtables and webinars with 
shareholders. 5  By specifying 20% or more votes against and by directing companies to consider smaller 
shareholders as well as major ones, the revised Code puts more stress on the importance of effective shareholder 
engagement, which will contribute substantially to a company’s success. 
The last detailed change regarding the importance of positive relationships between companies, 
shareholders and stakeholders concerns workforce engagement. Provision 5 directs the board to engage with the 
workforce through one or a combination of the following methods: a director appointed by the workforce, a 
formal workforce advisory panel and a designated non-executive director.6  In addition to Provision 5, Provision 
6 states that the workforce should be able to raise concerns in confidence.7 Often, the communications between 
the workforce and the company is deemed as the employee voice, and thus the policy of communication should 
include those with structured work arrangements (permanent, fixed-term, zero-hour) and all staff members who 
are impacted by the board's decisions. For instance, businesses should consider including persons engaged in 
service arrangements, department staff and remote workers irrespective of their geographical location. 
Companies should know who they employ and why. 8  Although the revised Code emphasises workforce 
engagement by directing companies to appoint a director from within the workforce, it does not provide the 
mechanism for choosing that director even in the Guidance on Board Effectiveness, so this process may be 
challenging for companies.  
Another substantial change in the revised Code is its emphasis on the composition of high-performing 
boards and on diversity through deferent detailed changes. One such change is the Code’s focus on the 
boardroom’s independence and on constructive challenges. To ensure the boardroom’s independence, the revised 
Code requires the board to provide a clear explanation of when circumstances likely to weaken a non-executive 
director’s independence (mentioned in Provision 10 or other relevant circumstances)9. This requirement aims to 
assert the importance of the boardroom’s independence; the FRC wish all companies take it seriously. In 
addition to this demand, for the first time, the FRC asks chairs not to remain in their position for more than nine 
years.10  However, it may be challenging for companies to comply with this limited period. Currently, 25 
companies in FTSE 100 and 49 in FTSE 250 fail to comply with this provision.11 Moreover, it has been argued 
that, although the 'comply or justify' system can be exploited to make non-compliance with the Code more 
 
1 Financial Reporting Council (FRC), Guidance on Board Effectiveness (2018) 
2 Corporate Governance Code, (n 2) 
3 The UK corporate Governance Code, KPMG  (2018) <https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/uk/pdf/2018/07/uk-corporate-governance-
code.pdf> accessed 28 April 2020 
4 Corporate Governance Code, (n 2) 
5 Ibid  
6 Corporate Governance Code, (n 2) 
7 Ibid  
8Guidance on Board Effectiveness, (n 4) 
9 Corporate Governance Code, (n 2) 
10 Ibid, Provision 19 
11 Financial Reporting Council (FRC), Annual Review of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2020) 
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acceptable, a culture of compliance can contribute to a turnover in leadership.1   
Emphasis on diversity within high-performing boards is another detailed change. The revised Code seeks to 
expand boards' understanding of diversity and to ensure that recruitment and succession planning activities are 
targeted at fostering diversity, not just of gender but also of social and ethnic backgrounds. Principle J of the 
revised Code notes that ‘‘appointments to the board should be subject to a formal, rigorous and transparent 
procedure, and an effective succession plan should be maintained for board and senior management. Both 
appointments and succession plans should be based on merit and objective criteria and, within this context, 
should promote diversity of gender, social and ethnic backgrounds, cognitive and personal strengths”.2 It was not 
enough for the FRC to encourage the companies to promote diversity in the boardroom. Therefore, the revised 
Code requires firms to promote workforce diversity by expanding the nominating committee’s tasks to oversee 
the creation of a diversified pipeline.3 Provision 23 of the revised Code says that the nomination committee’s 
work should be described in the annual report, including the gender balance of those in senior management and 
their direct reports.4 Although the FRC stresses the importance of different types of diversity, only gender 
balance is required to be reported. Thus, companies might consider other forms of diversity to be less serious.  
The third fundamental change confirms the significance of a well-defined purpose and an approach 
consistent with a healthy corporate culture. The board should determine the company’s purpose and create a plan 
to achieve it, based on the principles and behaviours that form its culture and its way of conducting business. A 
company's purpose is the reason it operates. It is the board's duty to establish and confirm the business’s function 
and purpose. A company with a clear purpose is more likely to express its operations plans and to have a well-
developed policy and approach to risks. Moreover, a well-defined purpose could help companies to engage with 
their workforces, consumers and wider society.5 It is clear that the revised Code encourages companies to pay 
more attention to their purpose, and this is expressed explicitly in Principle B.6 The company’s purpose should 
be consistent with its culture, as it is explained in Provision 2. The FRC is convinced that organisational culture 
is a critical element of long-term, sustainable success. Within a stable society, structures, procedures and 
individuals coalesce to promote long-term sustainability and build trust. Likewise, a bad culture poses 
considerable business risk.7 The board is expected to assess and monitor the health of the company’s culture. 
Furthermore, the Guidance on Board Effectiveness 2018 provides some features of a healthy culture that can be 
used in the assessment process, namely honesty, openness, respect, adaptability, reliability, recognition, 
acceptance of challenge, accountability and a sense of shared purpose. 8  Thus, positive culture should be 
considered in the boardroom’s discussions and should be reported in the annual report. 
Although the revised Code encourages companies to adopt and report on a healthy culture, companies face 
some problems in establishing such a culture. Changing the corporate culture may be easy in principle, but it is 
difficult in practice. Proof of this is the story of Volkswagen discussed by Professor Alice Belcher.9  She argued 
that an obstacle to companies’ assessment of the health of their culture is the differing concepts of corporate 
culture. The functionalist philosophy considers business culture to include all that can and should be exploited in 
the interest of corporations.10 The interpretive approach considers corporate culture to be generated by everyone 
in an enterprise and not fully controllable by the boardroom.11 According to Professor Belcher, the management 
literature also shows the enormous intellectual, technical and functional challenges UK boards experience in 
attempting to assess and comment on their company culture, as mandated by the UK Code for 2018.12 As result 
of this problem, the FRC noted in its Annual Review of the Uk Corporate Governance Code (2020) that many 
companies faced challenges in creating an effective culture.13 Consequently, the FRC may need to better explain 
its concept of a healthy corporate culture in the Guidance on Board Effectiveness.    
The last primary change to the Corporate Governance Code is the new emphasis on designing proportionate 
remuneration policies and implementing practices to promote sustainable success. The aim of this change is 
demonstrated in the Government’s response to the Green Paper consultation.14 The reason for this reform is 
public concern about the unnecessary complexity of executive pay, the role of driver compensation and the 
 
1 KPMG, (n 6) 
2 Corporate Governance Code, (n 2) 
3 KPMG, (n 6) 
4 Corporate Governance Code, (n 2) 
5 Guidance on Board Effectiveness, (n 4) 
6 Corporate Governance Code, (n 2) 
7 KPMG, (n 6) 
8 Guidance on Board Effectiveness, (n 4) 
9 Belcher, Claire, Corporate culture: Changing board responsibilities and changing governance rhetoric. In RAIS Conference Proceedings 
(2018) <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1568368> 
10 Ibid  
11 Ibid  
12 Ibid  
13 Annual Review, (n 16) 
14 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, The Government response to the green paper consultation (2017) 
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connection between executive pay and broader workplace experiences. As a consequence of this concern, the 
government invited the FRC to revise the Code to clarify the steps that listed companies should take when major 
shareholders are opposed to executive compensation policies and awards and to give remuneration committees 
greater responsibility for controlling their company's salaries and benefits, as well as allow them to communicate 
with the workforce to clarify how executive remuneration is harmonised with broader company remuneration 
policies. Thus, being aware of the purpose of the revised Code facilitates the understanding of it. 
One of the revised Code’s detailed changes regarding remuneration is that it encourages directors to 
exercise critical judgment and discretion about remuneration results, taking broader circumstances into 
consideration. Provision 37 states that ‘‘Remuneration schemes and policies should enable the use of discretion 
to override formulaic outcomes. They should also include provisions that would enable the company to recover 
and/or withhold sums or share awards and specify the circumstances in which it would be appropriate to do so”.1 
When deciding on remuneration incentives, the remuneration committee must exercise discretion and must be 
mindful of the potential numerical consequences and public reaction resulting from its decisions. Remuneration 
programmes should have the flexibility to circumvent formulaic findings.2  For example, the revised Code 
enables remuneration results to be overridden, such as if the calculation of a given performance situation does 
not reflect the company's actual performance over time or the success of a particular director.3  However, 
overriding formulaic outcomes is a critical issue and may backfire when it is not done appropriately.4 
 
Wates Principles 
Corporate governance reforms did not stop at this point with reforming the Corporate Governance Code; the 
Wates Corporate Governance Principles for Large Companies came out in 2018 to continue this reform. The 
purpose of the Wates Principles is to provide a structure to help large private companies satisfy legal standards 
and promote long-term sustainability in this critical field. Recognizing this, the Wates Principles urge businesses 
to adopt a series of core behaviours to protect stakeholders’ trust and to support the economy and the community 
in general.5 Moreover, companies should report on these principles, which took effect on 1 January 2019. 
The Wates Principles consist of six principles, some of which are very similar to those in the Corporate 
Governance Code (2018) discussed previously in this document; however, two principles require further 
explanation, as they differ from those in the revised Code and have not yet been mentioned in this article.  
The first is that there should be a good perception of their role and obligations by the board and individual 
directors.6 The board’s performance should promote effective decision-making.7 A successful board should 
develop and retain corporate governance policies, including consistent reporting lines and obligations to promote 
efficient decision-making. A board should develop structured and rigorous internal mechanisms to ensure that 
programmes and controls function efficiently and that the information it collects is accurate and credible, 
allowing managers to track and analyse the company's results to make informed decisions.8 The second is that 
the board should support the company's long-term sustainable success by identifying opportunities to generate 
and retain value and monitoring the assessment and mitigation of risks. 9  An organisation’s board should 
determine how it produces and retains long-term profitability.10 An effective board has a great ability to identify 
future opportunities and risks.  
As mentioned above, the Wates Principles are similar to those in the Corporate Governance Code (2018). 
The difference is in the way they operate. The Corporate Governance Code provides principles and provisions 
that require compliance or explanation in the absence of compliance. In contrast, the Wates Principles do not 
have provisions, and they include a guidance that helps companies fully understand the principles and explains 
the principles’ application given the company’s circumstances. However, many responses to the consultation 
about the Wates Principles issued by the FRC found the guidance to be too discursive.11 Although the Corporate 
Governance Code’s comply or explain policy does not restrict companies to the principles and provisions, the 
Wates Principles gives companies even more flexibility in reporting on their compliance. However, the 
similarity between the Wates Principles and the Corporate Governance Code might affect the expected 
effectiveness of the Wates Principles since they do not provide the desired addition.  
The FRC claims that these substantial changes would lead to better actors in the capital market, resulting in 
 
1 Corporate Governance Code, (n 2) 
2 Guidance on Board Effectiveness, (n 4) 
3 KPMG, (n 6) 
4 The Guidance on Board Effectiveness 2018 provides relevant information about how the overriding should take place 
5 Financial Reporting Council (FRC), The Wates Corporate governance Principles for Large Private Companies (2018) 
6 Ibid 
7 Ibid  
8 Ibid  
9 Ibid  
10 Ibid  
11 Financial Reporting Council (FRC), Feedback Statement the Wates Corporate Governance Principles for Large Private Companies (2018) 
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benefits to the environment, economy and broader society. However, the effectiveness of these changes in 
producing investors and companies that can solve economic, environmental and social problems should be 
assessed separately. Solving economic problems is the main purpose of corporate governance reform, as it 
results from the collapse of some UK companies. Most of the principles and provisions of the revised Code and 
the Wates Principles focus on enabling companies to overcome economic difficulties and bolster the national 
economy. This aim is welcomed by companies and investors as it aligns with their wish to avoid business 
collapse; this means they should comply with the principles and improve the national economy.  
Environmental and social problems did not receive the same attention, and many responses to the 
consultation about the Wates Principles said that environmental and social problems were not accorded 
satisfactory significance in the Guidance.1  Moreover, companies and investors might be less motivated to 
comply with principles referring to social and environmental issues, which could make them even less effective. 
It is argued that the Wates Principles do not adequately apply corporate governance to the ties between business 
and society; however, the Wates Principles are welcomed as a starting point.2 Thus, the changes made regarding 
economic problems may be considered substantial enough to enable companies to solve them. In contrast, the 
changes regarding social and environmental issues are less effective, but they may be deemed a starting point for 
further effort in these fields.  
 
Conclusion    
In conclusion, the FRC made some substantial changes to the Corporate Governance Code in 2018. One of the 
major changes is the new emphasis on good relations between businesses, shareholders and stakeholders. The 
second fundamental change is the focus on diversity in the composition of high-performance boards. The third 
primary shift is the recognition of the value of clearly established goals and strategies that align with a healthy 
corporate culture. The last significant adjustment to the Code is the focus on implementing pay systems and 
procedures for sustainable results. Moreover, as part of the corporate governance reforms, the FRC also 
established the Wates Principles in 2018. However, these substantial changes might promote companies’ 
performance when facing economic issues and enable them to solve these problems. On the other hand, the 
revisions regarding social and environmental problems are less effective; therefore, more work on these issues is 
required in the coming years.       
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